





Consider a seemingly simple moral decision. While out walking, you see a child stepping onto
the road to cross to the other side. Until recently, this was a one-way street. And it seems
the child does not know that traffic now runs both ways, because they are looking in just one
direction. Meanwhile, a long line of traffic bears down on them from the other side. If the child
continues their crossing, it is clear that they will be squashed by the leading car. (Perhaps you
can see that the driver is rummaging in their glove-box, oblivious to the child before them.) But,
fortunately, you are not far from the child. If you dash forward, you can grab them in time to
stop them stepping into the path of traffic. If you do, they will be saved. If you do not, they
will die.
You may have various reasons to save the child, and perhaps even reasons not to. But let
us focus on just one source of reasons: how good the outcome of each action would be. And it
seems obvious that the outcome in which the child survives will be better than that in which
they die - the former will contain more moral value in total, resulting from that child going on
to enjoy the rest of their (presumably good) life.
But will it? Will saving the child produce an outcome with greater moral value? In reality, it
likely will not, thanks to two quirks of our physical setting. The first is that saving the child will
have causal ramifications far beyond producing just one additional life that is worth living. To see
why, note that many of the physical systems we interact with on a daily basis are chaotic and, as
a result, small interventions on those systems typically result in wildly different outcomes in the
future. The traffic flow in a city is one such system (see Lighthill & Whitham 1955). By allowing
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or preventing the child being hit by that car, you would allow or prevent a temporary standstill
in traffic on that street. Over the following hours, this would alter traffic flow throughout the
system, momentarily delaying or advancing countless other drivers. Depending on the size of
your city, this would change which other traffic accidents occur and where. And beyond this,
saving the child means that they will continue their life, with all the street-crossing and driving
they will ever do, and so you will alter the traffic flow on countless other evenings too. Likewise
for the street-crossing done by every one of the child’s descendants. Effectively, by saving that
child, you have caused and prevented many, many other traffic accidents and the resulting deaths,
likely far outweighing the value of the child’s life. And that’s merely through disrupting traffic,
rather than the disruptions you cause to many other chaotic systems (see Section 2). So you
cannot confidently say that saving the child will result in an outcome of greater total value - we
are clueless as to whether the long-run effects of your action will do more harm or good overall.
So we are clueless as to whether it is better to save the child or not (see also Greaves 2016;
MacAskill & Mogensen n.d.). And this is deeply counterintuitive - our intuition suggests that it
is clearly better to save the child.
Chaos is one problem for comparing outcomes by their total values. Here is another: our
universe may be infinite, or so the current science suggests. In light of recent developments
in cosmology, we should expect that, no matter what actions we take, the future will contain
infinitely many morally valuable lives.1 So too should we expect that, no matter what we do,
those lives will include infinitely many quite good ones (with value greater than some ε > 0, on
some cardinal scale), and infinitely many quite bad ones (with value less than −ε). In the case
of saving the child or not, there will be infinitely many quite good lives and infinitely quite bad
lives regardless of your choice. Which outcome contains more value? Neither. For each, we have
an infinite subtotal of positive value and an infinite subtotal of negative value (on whichever
cardinal scale is used) - with those summed together, the final total is undefined. We cannot say
that either total value is greater, or less, than the other. Plausibly, this means that we cannot
say that either outcome is better ; the two outcomes are incomparable. And, as before, this is
deeply counterintuitive - it seems obvious that it is better to save the child.
1This is implied by both the constant cosmological constant model (Wald, 1983; Carroll, 2017) and the
inflationary view (Garriga & Vilenkin, 2001), each of which is widely accepted among physicists and well-
supported by the current body of evidence. Each predicts that our physical universe will be infinite in either
spatial volume or temporal duration. They also each predict that the local events across an infinite sub-region
of our universe will consist of statistical fluctuations from a cold, high-entropy state, and so will be effectively
random. And among infinitely many such small-scale regions, we should expect every physically possible state
to arise infinitely many times. So take any small-scale phenomenon you might think is morally valuable e.g., a
human brain processing a sensation of intense pleasure. Over our universe with its infinite volume, we should
expect identical such brains to arise infinitely many times (see Carroll 2017 and Davenport & Olum 2010 for
further detail).
2
Both of these problems threaten moral theories that are aggregative with respect to value:
those which say that an outcome is better than another if and only if it contains a greater
total aggregate of moral value, impartially construed. (The betterness of options, or lotteries
over outcomes, may be a little more complicated - see §2.4.) Given the nature of our universe,
both chaotic and infinite, this means that we often cannot say that one outcome is better than
another, even in cases where the correct verdict seems obvious. This is particularly worrying
if the correct moral theory is not just aggregative but also purely consequentialist - if, in all
decisions, you ought to perform whichever available action will result in the best outcome (or,
under uncertainty, the best lottery over outcomes). If so, it seems that we cannot say that
you ought to save the child. But even if the correct theory is not purely consequentialist, most
plausible ethical theories rely on the betterness of outcomes to make at least some judgements -
most say that, if an action brings about a greater total aggregate of value than the alternatives
do, that provides at least a pro tanto reason to choose it. Throughout this paper, I will focus
on theories which recognise at least that pro tanto reason. And such theories will have trouble
dealing with the above problems of chaos and infinite value - faced with either chaotic effects
or infinite future populations, they will often struggle to say that one outcome is better than
another, even in cases as simple as deciding whether to stop a child from walking into traffic.
Given this result, it seems that we should reject all such aggregative theories.
But, fortunately, we do not need to. We have some aggregative theories which overcome
each of the problems raised above. We have proposals for aggregative theories which compare
our options despite chaotic effects (see Section 2). And there have been a variety of aggregative
theories proposed to overcome the problem of infinite value. These theories of infinite aggregation
each step away from representing the total value of each world as a single real-valued sum, but
instead as some other mathematical object (see Vallentyne 1993; Vallentyne and Kagan 1997;
Lauwers and Vallentyne 2004; Bostrom 2011; Arntzenius 2014; Wilkinson 2020; Clark n.d.; and
Askell 2018 for a survey). We’ll see several of these in action in Section 3.
But we face a further, as yet unexplored, problem. If our universe is both infinite and widely
chaotic, we find ourselves in a more difficult spot. Our solutions to the problem of chaos fail if
outcomes also contain infinite value. And most of our solutions to the problem of infinite value
fail to - they can only compare highly idealised pairs of outcomes, not those that differ by lasting
chaotic effects, ad infinitum, such as every pair of outcomes we ever must compare in practice.
In the decision of whether to save the child or not, most of our existing methods say that the
outcomes are incomparable. Neither is better. And, if the value of outcomes is all that weighs
in favour of either choice, we have no reason to choose one rather than the other. And the same
holds in many of the moral decisions you or I will ever make. Effectively, chaos and infinite value
together undermine a large swathe of our moral decision-making.
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In this paper, I seek a solution to this further problem. Before that, in Section 2, I’ll explain
in greater depth how our actions almost always result in chaotic, long-lasting changes to the
world - this goes far beyond just affecting traffic flows. Then, in Section 3, I’ll lay out the
further problem of chaos ad infinitum, demonstrating how the problem arises for each of several
classes of aggregative theories tailor-made for the infinite setting. I’ll also demonstrate that some
(and only some) aggregative theories can avoid the problem. But these theories will be slightly
peculiar. In Section 4, I’ll extend those theories beyond comparisons of chaotic outcomes to
cover comparisons of lotteries over chaotic outcomes. Section 5 is the conclusion.
As we will see, the combined problem of chaos and infinite value sheds light on which, if any,
aggregative theories might be the correct one. After all, only some theories can overcome the
problem. But all of those theories imply something deeply counterintuitive: that comparisons of
outcomes can depend on the positioning of moral value in space and time. You might think this
implication unacceptable - surely, moral evaluations must be independent of precisely who obtains
value and where they are located. But in an infinite, chaotic universe, only aggregative theories
that violate this independence can make plausible judgements. And so we have a compelling
argument for accepting a peculiar form of aggregative theory; that or we have a reductio against
aggregation, and should abandon it altogether. I will leave it to you to decide which conclusion
to draw.
2 Chaos
Many of the physical systems in our universe are chaotic. Chaos has a technical definition (see
Feldman 2019: 83) but, for our purposes, we can focus on just one of the necessary conditions
for a system to be chaotic: its states at later times are highly sensitive to its initial states.2 They
are highly sensitive in that if we were to ever-so-slightly alter the properties of the system in the
earlier state - perhaps in an arbitrarily small way - the later states would change in a much more
significant way. For instance, consider the system of a pendulum, with the initial state given by
where and when you release it to begin swinging. If the pendulum is a chaotic system, releasing
it from a millimetre higher may result in it swinging in a wildly different, seemingly random
manner.3 But this need not be because the pendulum system is indeterministic - systems may
2Of course, a system need not be chaotic for its later states to be highly sensitive to initial conditions. Systems
which are not chaotic may even be more sensitive to those conditions - as Gleick (1987: 292) points out, given
the attractor states observed in chaos theory, chaotic systems often follow similar large-scale patterns regardless
of what happens at a small scale. But the systems I describe here are all genuinely chaotic ones. And, although
their chaotic nature is not necessary for demonstrating the problem I have in mind, it is sufficient.
3This is exactly what occurs with double-rod pendulums, even though they are governed by quite simple,
deterministic laws. See Rubinsztejn (2018) for a helpful demonstration.
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be governed by deterministic laws (and indeed must be, for the system to meet the technical
definition of chaos), but those laws and the factors they depend on may still be extremely
complex, resulting in chaotic and unpredictable behaviour.
Three such chaotic systems are: the composition of the human population; the Earth’s
atmosphere; and the positions of the planets in our solar system. And our actions frequently
change all of these, now and indefinitely far into the future.
2.1 Identities
Recall the case in which you can either save or not save the child from walking into traffic. If you
save the child, they will live out the rest of their life. Conditional on that life being sufficiently
long, they may have children of their own, who then may have children of their own, and so
on. If they would have a long line of descendants, your choice changes whether or not those
descendants come to exist. You would thereby change the composition of the human population
well into the future.
How likely is it that that child would spawn a long line of descendants? Very likely, it turns
out. At least in the United Kingdom, 97.9% of 5 year old children live to at least 45 (Office for
National Statistics, 2019). And, by the age of 45, 82% of people in England or Wales have had
at least one child (Office for National Statistics, 2018). Supposing that the child is 5 years old
and that assuming that current rates hold4, it can be shown that the child’s lineage will last
forever, in expectation. Not just that, but the probability that they have at least some genetic
descendants at a given time converges to 0.7 as the time elapsed approaches infinity.5 So there
4Current rates may not hold, but they are still a reasonably good predictor of future rates. We can anticipate
that UK birthrates will be a particularly good predictor, as the mean number of births is very close to 2. In the
long run, for humanity to not die out from too low a birthrate, the long-run mean will need to be roughly 2.
5From ONS (ibid), by the age of 45, 18% of Britons have had no children, 18% have had 1 child, 37% have
had 2, 17% have had 3, and 10% have had 4 or more. And from ONS (2019), 97.4% of Britons live to the age
of 45. For simplicity, I’ll assume that no one has children after the age of 45. And, conservatively, I’ll assume
that no one who dies before 45 has any children, everyone who has 4 or more children just has 4, and that
the child’s descendants aren’t any more likely to have (many) children just because their forebears did. Then,
conditional on that first child living to 45, we can represent the number of their descendants in each subsequent
generation n by Zn =
∑Zn−1
i=1 Xi, where the Xis are independent, identically-distributed random variables with
P (Xi = 0) = 0.201, P (Xi = 1) = 0.175, P (Xi = 2) = 0.360, P (Xi = 3) = 0.166, and P (Xi = 2) = 0.097.
Readers familiar with stochastic processes may notice that this is a Galton-Watson process and that, as such,
the probability of any descendants remaining by generation n is given by P (Zn > 0) = 0.201 + 0.175×P (Zn−1 >
0) + 0.36× P (Zn−1 > 0)2 + 0.166× P (Zn−1 > 0)3 + 0.097× P (Zn−1 > 0)4 (Grimmett & Stirzaker 1992: §5.4).
That probability converges to p as n→∞ if there is some p such that P (Zn > 0) = P (Zn−1 > 0) = p solves that
equation. Here, it does, for p = 0.715. Multiplying that by probability that the first child lives to 45 (0.979), we
have a probability of (at least) 0.700 that the child has descendants for as long as humanity survives.
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is a probability of at least 0.7 that your choice in that situation will change the genetics of some
portion of humans for as long as humanity exists.
And this will change the events that happen in those descendants’ lives and the lives of those
they interact with. With differences in genetics come countless differences in heritable traits,
including height, body mass index (Wainschtein 2019), intelligence (Plomin & Deary 2015),
empathy (Melchers et al. 2016), and plenty of others. At least some of these traits affect the
quality of a person’s life to a significant extent, and at least some (e.g., empathy) affect the
quality of the lives of others. So significantly changing the genetic composition of humanity
millennia into the future will also, at least occasionally, affect the moral value that particular
humans obtain and the times at which they obtain it.
But this is not the only way your choice will affect the future of humanity. As noted earlier,
saving that child would prevent a delay to the vehicle that would have hit them, as well as
those that follow it. This will change the positions of those vehicles at each time throughout the
remainder of their journeys. As well, due to the dynamics of traffic flow, this will change the
positions of countless vehicles throughout your city for the rest of the afternoon. At least a small
number of the lucky drivers on the road that afternoon would be on their way home to conceive
a child. And you will almost certainly delay or advance the moment at which their child is
conceived, by delaying or advancing their parent’s journey. But, as pointed out by Parfit (1986:
ch16) and Greaves (2016), delaying or advancing conception by even a fraction of a second will
likely change which sperm fertilises the egg, and so too the genetics of the resulting child. And
just like the child you saved (or failed to save), that child is likely to spawn an indefinitely long
line of descendants.
So too, similar changes will be made by that child you saved (or failed to save) throughout
their life, and by every one of their descendants. Every time they delay traffic by crossing
a road, or encourage (or dissuade) their friends from having children, or introduce someone to
their future co-parent, they make similar changes to genetic composition of humanity indefinitely
far into the future. And so the scale of the effects of your choice is amplified many times over.
In this sense, the composition of the human population is a chaotic system. By making the
tiniest of changes - adding or removing just one person - you will typically make widespread,
unpredictable, and permanent changes to the system as a whole.
2.2 Weather patterns
Another archetypal chaotic system, and one which we constantly interact with, is the Earth’s
atmosphere. It was this system, and its behaviour under small perturbations, that inspired
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Edward Lorenz’ work on chaos theory (e.g., Lorenz 1963).
Suppose you save the child from walking into traffic. By doing so, you will move your body and
disturb the air around you, such that the air flow around you will be slightly different from how
it would have been had you not dashed forward. The oncoming traffic will continue unhindered,
and disturb the air even more. Likewise, your action will result in the child continuing to go
about their life for many years, disturbing the air around them with every movement they make.
If they end up ever driving a car themselves, they will make even greater disturbances.
But even quite small disturbances to the air within the Earth’s atmosphere results in major,
unpredictable changes to weather patterns, indefinitely far into the future (ibid). Lorenz (1972)
claimed, iconically, that changing even an event as trivial as whether a butterfly in Brazil flapping
its wings at a given time and place is often enough to change whether and when a tornado
occurs in Texas. As Broome (2019) points out, Lorenz may be wrong - it is unclear whether the
disturbance of a mere butterfly flap is dampened out by the air’s viscosity or not - but it is clear
that larger-scale disturbances do have this effect (Palmer et al. 2014). Some such disturbances
are: each human breath, which releases 140 times as much energy as a butterfly’s wing flap; and
running an electric fan for a single second, which releases 10 million times as much.6
Your choice of whether to save the child will change whether, when, and where countless
human breaths, uses of electric fans, and other atmospheric disturbances take place. And so
you will affect the timing and location of tornadoes, cyclones, wind gusts, rainfall, and so on
indefinitely far into the future. And likewise by affecting the lives of the child’s descendants -
they too will take breaths, use fans, and so on. But tornadoes and other weather events have
significant effects on the lives of many people. So, by changing the timing and location of these
events, you affect the moral value that particular humans obtain at particular times indefinitely
far into the future.
2.3 Planetary motion
Yet another chaotic system is the position of the planets in our solar system under the gravita-
tional influence of one another (Malhotra et al. 2001).7
Suppose yet again that you save the child from walking into traffic. By doing so, you cause
the child’s body to continue moving about the Earth’s surface for the remainder of their life,
6These ratios are calculated from figures given in Davidovits (2008: 78-9), Putensen and Wrigge (2007), Tang
et al. (2013), and the packaging of an electric fan I had on hand.
7In fact, it was while studying a similar system that Henri Poincaré (1890) inadvertently laid the foundations
for chaos theory.
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rather than perhaps remain stationary in a cemetery. (Likewise, you change the positions of
yourself and a great many cars in your city.)
Like all objects with mass, a human body casts a gravitational field. Move a human body and
that field changes. At the most extreme, you might move that body from one side of the Earth
to the other. By doing so, you would slightly change the distribution of mass of the Earth and
its inhabitants. But this distribution is important - since the Earth’s mass occupies more than
a single point, the strength of the gravitational field from other planets and celestial bodies will
differ from one side of the Earth to the other. So changing the distribution of mass can change
the gravitational force applied to the Earth and its inhabitants. Just from the gravitational field
exerted by Mercury (the planet most often closest to Earth), moving an 80 kilogram human
body from one side of Earth to the other has an effect equivalent to changing the Earth’s mass
by 1.6 milligrams.8 Over the course of 24 hours, that results in the Earth’s position changing by
4× 10−30 metres (or 40 ‘attometres’).
That distance may seem trivial. But the celestial bodies in our solar system form a chaotic
system: small disturbances bring large changes, at least over long enough periods of time. If
the Earth’s position is shifted by some distance now, it is overwhelmingly likely that its future
position is shifted by an even greater distance, although we cannot predict exactly where it
will end up. Typically, if you shift the Earth by some distance now, its position in 10 million
years will end up shifted by approximately ten times that distance (Laskar 1989). If you shift
the Earth’s position by 4× 10−30 metres today, you will typically cause a 4 metre difference in
the Earth’s position in 300 million years - still trivial, perhaps. But wait another 120 million
years and the difference will typically grow to about 4 billion kilometres. For reference, that is
roughly the distance of Neptune from the sun. And, as you might guess, this would have some
serious effects on what occurs on Earth - for comparison, the full range of temperature variations
we experience each year are a result of varying our distance from the sun by a mere 5 million
kilometres.
8The calculation for this is somewhat complex, but follows from the following facts: the gravitational force
exerted on one object with mass m1 by another of mass m2 and at distance r is given by F = 6.674×10−11×m1m2r2 ;
Earth has a mass of 5.972× 1024 (kilograms); Mercury has a mass of 3.285× 1023 and lies at an average distance
of 7.7×1010 (metres) from the Earth; and Earth’s radius (and so the distance of the 80kg human from the centre)
is 6.371× 106. Assume that Mercury lies at its average distance from us, that the human body will be positioned
at either at the point on the Earth’s surface nearest to Mercury or the point furthest away, and that the system
of Earth and the human body will have the same centre of gravity regardless of the human’s position. Using the
formula for gravitational force, it is straightforward to show that the force applied to Mercury (and, likewise, to
the joint body of Earth plus the human body) increases when the human body is placed on the opposite side,
equivalent to increase in mass of 1.569 milligrams. Applying the equation for acceleration, F = ma, this gives us
a change in acceleration of 9.713× 10−40 ms−2. Integrating twice for the difference in position, and letting time
be the number of seconds in a day, we obtain a difference in position of 3.625× 10−30 metres.
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That’s what happens if we move a human body from one side of the planet to the other. But
similar effects occur if the child you save (or any of their descendants) spends a day in another
city or country. The initial difference in the Earth’s position will be smaller but, over long
enough time spans, it will grow ever larger. And this applies not just to the Earth’s position
- the bodies in our solar system also exert gravitational fields on neighbouring systems and
beyond. Over long enough time spans, these changes would ripple out to affect other planets,
any civilisations which inhabit them, and any moral value which arises there. By this route,
your choice of whether to save the child will affect events indefinitely far into the future and into
remote space. From some time onward, your choice will change the moral value which arises for
almost every person at every future time.9
2.4 The problem
Why are any of these effects a problem for our moral evaluations?10
Let us stick with the seemingly clear-cut decision of whether to stop the child from walking
into traffic. If you let the child die, the future of the world will proceed in one particular way. If
you save them, the future will proceed very differently, now and continuing far into the future:
the genetic composition of much of humanity will be altered; the Earth’s weather patterns will
be altered; and the trajectory of each planet in our solar system will diverge further and further
from where they would otherwise be, indefinitely into the future.
To compare these outcomes on an aggregative ethical theory, we look to the total value of
each. Assume for now that each has a finite total sum of value, and so too does each interval of
time - that those values can be represented on a cardinal scale with a finite real number. (Infinite
totals can wait until the next section.) Then we can obtain the total value of each outcome by
summing up the value obtained over each consecutive interval of time.11 For some outcome O1,
9This continues to hold even if the future lasts infinitely long and contains infinitely many persons. On the
constant cosmological constant model mentioned in Footnote 1, infinitely many future persons will be the product
of quantum fluctuations which arise after our universe enters its ‘heat death’ era. The manner and timing of these
fluctuations will be affected - although not predictably - by even subtle changes in gravity (as by the Hawking
effect), electric field strength (as by the Casimir effect), and, plausibly, many other factors too. And we can easily
influence the gravitational properties of an infinite region of points in the post-heat-death vacuum - by radically
changing the positions of planets and star systems over millions of years, as described above, we would produce
gravitational changes that ripple outwards in spacetime, infinitely far into the future. So that choice to save the
child from traffic, for instance, would continue to have ramifications infinitely far into the future.
10The following argument originates with Greaves (2016) and, before that, was hinted at by Lenman (2000).
11If the totals did not admit a finite cardinal representation, we would not necessarily be able to obtain the
correct totals by summing over a partition of times. As Cain (1995) shows, with non-finite totals, summing over
one partition rather than another may give a different total. So we then must ensure that we choose the right
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we can write the values for those intervals like this.
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 ... tN
O1 : X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 ... XN
Suppose O1 is the outcome of letting the child die. Apart from the death of the child, we
will, and should, be uncertain about many of the events from then on. So we will be uncertain of
the moral value at each later time. This means that, when making judgements about the actual
outcome of your action, each Xi will be a random variable with some probability distribution.
12
(The probability distributions will differ for different times - different Xis - based on what you
do know about the future.) And when you say that the total value of the outcome will probably
be such and such, you effectively say that the sum of all Xis will probably be such and such, if
we draw each Xi randomly from their respective probability distributions.
Let’s use O2 to denote whatever happens if you save the child. This outcome too will contain
a random value Yi at each time ti. This outcome will be better if and only if the sum of all of
those Yis is greater than the sum of all of the Xis in O1. Or, equivalently, if the sum of Yi −Xi
over every time ti is positive. But what would those differences be? To start with, there will be
the difference of all of the value in the life of the child saved, which we can represent as value
1. And there may be plenty of events in both outcomes which are left unchanged - including
many of the events which happen in the short-term before the chaotic effects of your actions
start to make large-scale changes. And then there will be all of the large-scale differences you
make via changing the genetic makeup of humanity, the weather, and planetary positions. We
can represent the resulting differences in moral value by random variables Z1, Z2, etc (that are
independent and identically distributed).13 And, since we have no reason to think that each of
these differences will favour one outcome or the other, each one will be drawn from a probability
distribution which is symmetric about 0.
Adding up all of those differences, the difference in total value between O1 and O2 will look
partition.
12These distributions may be determined by either your subjective or evidential probabilities. All of what
follows can be read in terms of either.
13How should we interpret each Zi? Suppose we took Zi as simply giving the difference in value at each time
interval ti, so that Zi = Yi − Xi, in which case the sum would go up to N ′ = N . But then we would have
little reason to think that these Zis are independent or identically distributed. We shouldn’t expect the scale
of the differences between worlds to be constant over time (the differences will likely grow over time) or quite
independent (if earlier changes are positive, it may be more likely that later changes are too). But, even so, it
will be possible to represent the sum of all Yi −Xi up to some future time tN by some sequence of independent,
identically distributed variables - the differences between some subtotals of the value up to tN . The Zis represent
such a sequence of such variables.
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like this:




And, by this equation, the difference follows a random walk, and a symmetric one at that.
As we sum the Zi up to some large N
′, it will typically look like this.
1
N ′
V (O2)− V (O1)
Figure 1: The difference in total value between O1 and O2, given by 1 +
∑N ′
i=1 Zi
Notice that this walk passes above and below 0 sporadically. It won’t stop doing so. For
large N ′, we cannot predict where the walk will be. Above or below 0? We have no clue. The
theory of random walks tells us that the probability that V (O2)−V (O1) is positive (or negative)
approaches 0.5 as N ′ approaches infinity. In fact, the probability already approximates 0.5 for
modest N ′ of even 10 or 100, at least in cases like this where we are certain of just one small,
initial difference. But no matter that initial difference, over a long future, it is as likely as not
that either outcome turns out worse.
This seems like bad news for the aggregationist. Even in seemingly simple decisions like this
- as well as many of the decisions we ever face in practice - we are radically uncertain as to
whether an action will actually turn out better than its alternatives. And if we make decisions
based even partly on our reasons to promote (actual) moral value, then those reasons seem to
give no guidance at all.
But this uncertainty isn’t fatal for the aggregationist project. We are deeply uncertain about
which action will actually turn out better, but we may not be uncertain about which action
looks better in expectation, given our uncertainty - we cannot say which action produces a better
outcome, but we might still be able to say which action produces a better lottery over possible
outcomes. And we can indeed do so for cases like this, as Greaves (ibid : 8-9) demonstrates.
11
Take the expectation of the total value for each outcome, and compare them, as below.
E(V (O2))− E(V (O1))





= 1 + 0
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the difference is positive; saving the child brings the greatest expected
total value. This is because all we have to tell the two lotteries apart is that we’re certain we’ll
save the one child under one, and certain that we won’t under the other. What of the future
events, with values represented by Xi and Yi (and their difference by Zi)? We know nothing
about the effects of our actions on them; we place the same probabilities on each possible value
of Xi as we do on each possible value of Yi. And so of course the difference in their expected
values is 0, since they’re identical. And so, in expectation, the value at every future time cancels
out, and all we are left with is the guaranteed value of the child’s life.
So, if we switch from comparing actions by the whatever total value their actual outcomes
contain, to comparing actions by the total expected values of their lotteries over outcomes, we
can say that it is better to save the child. This is the approach defended by Jackson (1991)
and other ‘subjective aggregationists’, who would say that the outcome is subjectively better if
you save the child, and that this is the normatively relevant sense of betterness. We may be
uncertain of which outcome is objectively better, but that need not trouble us. So, on at least
some aggregative views, we can still say that saving the child is better in a relevant sense and
that you should save them, despite the presence of widespread chaos.14
3 Chaos, with infinite value added
As we saw above, if the universe is finite then chaos poses a problem for aggregation. Unpre-
dictable chaotic effects lead to uncertainty over which outcome will actually turn out better.
But that need not stop us from making practical judgements - after all, we still know that some
outcome will be better (or that they will be equally good). We just need to respond to uncer-
tainty over which outcome that will be. And we can do that, by taking the expectation of the
finite total value of outcomes.
14The situation is different for objective aggregationist views, such as that defended by Railton (1984). Such
objective aggregationists will still find themselves clueless as to what they should do.
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But if the universe is infinite, chaos poses a greater problem. As we will see, in the infinite
context we are not just uncertain of which outcome will be better. Rather, we are certain that
neither of two outcomes is. We can say with certainty that those outcomes are incomparable or
else that they are equally good. Those are the verdicts given by almost every aggregative view
that has been proposed in the infinite setting. So, by those views, we again cannot say which is
better - to save the child from walking into traffic, or not to save them.
How we reach those verdicts will differ according to the aggregative theory we adopt in the
infinite context. We can separate the available theories into three categories: strongly anonymous
theories; weakly anonymous theories; and position-dependent theories. I’ll explain why each of
these commits us to implausible verdicts, in turn.
3.1 Strongly anonymous theories
A strongly anonymous theory is one which says that, when comparing one outcome to another,
the comparison depends only on how many15 persons who obtain each level of value. It does not
matter which persons obtain value in each outcome, nor their positions in space and time, their
hair colour, their height, nor any other qualitative properties except for whether they exist and
the level of value they obtain. So if two outcomes look identical after we censor the identity and
those other qualitative properties of each and every person, then those worlds must be equally
good.16
To put this precisely, call a view strongly anonymous if it satisfies the following condition.
Strong Anonymity : Let Oa, Ob, and Oa′ be any possible outcomes. If Oa′ can be
obtained from Oa by replacing the identities and qualitative properties of some subset
of persons in Oa, holding fixed the value they each obtain, then Oa is at least as good
as Ob if and only if Oa′ is at least as good as Ob.
When all possible outcomes contain only finitely many persons, Strong Anonymity is satisfied
by all plausible aggregative views. But it is less widely endorsed in the infinite setting. This is
15Specifically, I mean the cardinality of each such set of persons, rather than another notion of size like
containment or density.
16Strictly speaking, this last claim requires not just Strong Anonymity but also Transitivity: for any outcomes
Oa, Ob, and Oc, if Oa is at least as good as Ob and Ob is at least as good as Oc, then Oa is at least as good as
Oc. This is assumption is ubiquitous for aggregative theories of value, and so overwhelmingly plausible that I
will assume it without argument.
Take the outcomes Oa and Oa′ from the definition of Strong Anonymity and let Ob be any outcome which is
equally as good as Oa. Strong Anonymity implies that it is equally as good as Oa′ too. Then, by Transitivity,
Oa and Oa′ are equally good.
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because, in the infinite setting, Strong Anonymity clashes with other highly plausible principles,
e.g., the Pareto Over Persons principle (van Liedekerke 1995), which I’ll discuss below. As a
result, many views reject Strong Anonymity, including all of the weakly anonymous and position-
dependent theories that I mention below. But at least two authors do still endorse Strong
Anonymity in this setting: Bader (n.d.: 85-90) and Clark (n.d.).17
What do strongly anonymous theories say about realistic cases involving chaos? It turns out
that they say cannot say that any outcome is better than any other.
Returning to the case of saving or not saving the child from walking into traffic, we can
represent the two outcomes as below. In each outcome, each person obtains some amount of
value. For the child p1, they obtain value 0 if they die, and 1 if you save them. Then we
have some (perhaps finite) number of persons p2, p3, p4, and so on who are unaffected by your
choice and so who obtain the same value in both outcomes. For those persons, you are (at least
somewhat) uncertain of the values they each obtain, given by random variables X2, X3, and so
on, but these are the same in both outcomes. Then we have infinitely many persons pi, piii, and
so on who exist in both outcomes but who are affected by your choice. They also obtain random
values but, importantly, different random values in each outcome (e.g., Xi as against X
′
i ). And
then we have two distinct sets of infinitely many persons - pa, pb, etc and pα, pβ , etc - whose
existence is affected by your choice. In one outcome, one of the two groups exists and obtains
some random values. In the other, the other group exists.18
p1 p2 p3 p4 ... pi pii piii ... pa pb pc ... pα pβ pγ ...
O1 : 0 X2 X3 X4 ... Xi Xii Xiii ... Xa Xb Xc ... − − − ...






iii ... − − − ... Xα Xβ Xγ ...
What do we know about each of these random X values which make up the bulk of the value
in the universe? We don’t know exactly what each of them will be, as each is random. But
we do know that each will be drawn from some probability distribution, perhaps one of those
illustrated below.
17Interestingly, Clark (n.d.) denies Pareto Over Persons as an axiological principle but does still endorse an
analogous Pareto principle for choiceworthiness. This makes the view strongly anonymous in terms of axiology
but only weakly anonymous in terms of choiceworthiness (under a definition of Weak Anonymity different to the
one below, which replaces all mention of ‘better than’ with ‘more choiceworthy than’). It also rules out Clark’s
proposal as a suitable axiology for a purely consequentialist moral theory.
18Here, we have three infinite subgroups of persons in each world (and possibly four, if {p2, p3, ...} is infinite
too). Why would these all be infinite? The chaotic effects of your action will extend infinitely far into the future.
(See Footnote 9 above.) These include identity effects, so infinitely many people ({pa, pb, ...} and {pα, pβ , ...})
will exist in each outcome but not in the other. But, as well, infinitely many persons ({pi, pii, ...}) will have their
identities unchanged - for any given future person in one outcome, there is at least a non-zero probability that
their identity will remain the same regardless of your action, even if the value they obtain is changed. With















We know a few other things about these distributions. For one, we know that at least infinitely
many of these X values will be drawn from distributions which give non-zero probability density
to the values 0 and 1. After all, if these are possible values of the life of that child on the street,
then these values are well within the realm of epistemic possibility for persons in the future and
anywhere else in the universe. For two, we know that the distributions in O1 and O2 will be
similar - we should have the same distributions for Xi and X
′
i and for Xa and some corresponding
Xα (even their actual value turns out differently). After all, we have no reason to think that a
particular one of the outcomes will be better for each person. For three, it then follows that, for
any value v, if O1 contains infinitely many X values whose distributions give non-zero probability
density to v, then so too will O2. And for four, it also follows that neither outcome will contain
merely finitely many X values with some probability of obtaining any given v.
And that gives us enough information to compare O1 and O2. By the law of large numbers,
if an outcome contains infinitely many X values with non-zero probability of v, then it also
contains infinitely many persons who actually obtain value v (with probability arbitrarily close
to 1). And so that number is infinite for every value v that could possibly arise in either outcome,
including 0 and 1. If, for each outcome, we graph the number of people who end up actually
obtaining each value, both graphs will look like this.





















Here, ℵ0 is an infinite cardinality.19 And vmin and vmax are whichever are the greatest and
smallest possible X values in the outcome, which will be the same for both outcomes O1 and O2.
In short, for every possible value a person can obtain, both outcomes contain the same infinite
number of persons obtaining that value.20
But strongly anonymous theories compare outcomes based only on how many persons obtain
each level of value. In those terms, the outcomes O1 and O2 are identical. And so strongly
anonymous theories must say that they are equally good.
Thus, all such theories say that the outcome of saving the child from walking into traffic is
no better than the outcome of not saving them. Indeed, the outcomes are equally good. And
this carries over to almost every moral decision that agents like you or I will ever face in this
universe - we can represent the outcomes as we did above and, by similar reasoning, reach the
same verdict.
And that verdict is implausible. Surely the world in which the child is saved is better, or at
least it could be. And likewise for outcomes in almost every other moral decision we ever face.
It is a failure on the part of strongly anonymous theories that they cannot say this, at least not
in this chaotic, infinite universe of ours. I take this as a great enough failure that we should
reject all such theories.
3.2 Weakly anonymous theories
But there are other theories of aggregation in the infinite setting to which we can turn. An-
other major category is weakly anonymous theories. These are the theories which satisfy the
19In fact, this is the one infinite cardinality which is possible for a set of persons. Why? Any metaphysically
possible person must take up at least some minimum volume of space and non-zero duration of time. As spacetime
is a four-dimensional manifold with at least one dimension which extends infinitely far, we can only fit countably
many persons into spacetime (or ℵ0 persons).
20As stated, this argument assumes that there are finitely many possible levels of value, and therefore that
possible levels of value are discrete. This assumption is plausible, as small differences in duration and length are
discrete multiples of Planck time (or length), and so measures of value are likely to be discrete as well.
But a similar argument can still be made if possible values are continuous. In the continuous setting, it seems
highly plausible that Strong Anonymity can be strengthened to say that two outcomes must be equally good if,
for any arbitrarily short interval of possible values, they have exactly the same number of persons obtaining a
value within the interval. (This is an additional assumption but, I think, a modest one.) But all pairs of possible
outcomes will satisfy this - for any such interval somewhere between vmin and vmax, infinitely many persons
will have non-zero probability of obtaining value in that interval, in both outcomes. So infinitely many persons
will obtain a value in that interval, in both outcomes. Therefore, the outcomes must be equally good, at least
according to Strong Anonymity.
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following.21
Weak Anonymity : Let (Oa, Ob) and (Oc, Od) be any two ordered pairs of possible
outcomes. If (Oc, Od) can be obtained from (Oa, Ob) by replacing the (same) iden-
tities and qualitative properties of the same persons in both of the latter pair of
outcomes (in the same way), then Oc is at least as good as Od if and only if Oa is at
least as good as Ob.
This says something subtly (but crucially) different from Strong Anonymity. Outcomes need
not be equally good just because they have the same number of persons obtaining the same
values. Instead, any two outcome pairs must be compared the same way if those pairs contain
the same number of persons obtaining the same pairs of values across the two outcomes. If two
outcome pairs look identical once we censor the identities and those other qualitative properties
for each person, but we don’t censor the facts of which persons are the same across outcomes,
then those outcome pairs must be compared the same way.
To illustrate the difference between Strong and Weak Anonymity, consider the widely-accepted,
and deeply intuitive, principle of Pareto Over Persons.
Pareto Over Persons: Let Oa and Ob be any two possible outcomes which contain
precisely the same persons. If every person obtains at least as much value in Oa as
in Ob, then Oa is at least as good as Ob. If, as well, there is some person who obtains
more value in Oa, then Oa is strictly better than Ob.
In other words, if two outcomes contain precisely the same persons all obtaining the same
values, then those outcomes are equally good; and if we made one of the outcomes better for
some and worse for none, then we would make that outcome better. By intuition, this principle
is hard to deny. But deny it you must if you endorse Strong Anonymity - the two principles are
incompatible (van Liedekerke 1995). And perhaps this shouldn’t be surprising. After all, Strong
Anonymity forbids us from considering how any specific people do in an outcome, even compared
to another; so we cannot track identities between outcomes. But Weak Anonymity does permit
it - we can say that one outcome is better than another based on how individuals do in one
compared to the other, just as long as we say the same whenever we face a structurally identical
pair of outcomes, which Pareto Over Persons always will. So whether they satisfy Pareto is one
feature which distinguishes many weakly anonymous theories from strongly anonymous theories.
21In the literature, principles equivalent to this are also called relative anonymity (Asheim et al. 2010: 10) and
qualitativeness (Askell 2018).
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Like Strong Anonymity, both Weak Anonymity and Pareto are both endorsed by all plau-
sible aggregative views when our outcomes contain only finitely many persons. But neither is
universally accepted in the infinite setting. Like Strong Anonymity, each clashes with other
highly plausible principles.22 But unlike Strong Anonymity, Weak Anonymity (and Pareto too)
is widely endorsed e.g., in at least some of the proposals in Vallentyne and Kagan (1997: 11),
Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004), Arntzenius (2014: 55), and Askell (2018).
So what do weakly anonymous theories say about realistic cases, in which the available
outcomes are infinite and also differ by chaotic effects? Unfortunately, they stumble, following
in the footsteps of their strongly anonymous counterparts. They cannot say that any outcome
is better than any realistic alternative.
To see why, first consider again the same representations of O1 and O2 as above. To simplify
matters, we can label the relevant subgroups of persons in each: A) those who obtain the same
value in each outcome; B) those who obtain different random values but exist in both outcomes;
C) those who exist only in O1; and D) those who exist only in O2..
A B C D︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
p1 p2 p3 p4 ... pi pii piii ... pa pb pc ... pα pβ pγ ...
O1 : 0 X2 X3 X4 ... Xi Xii Xiii ... Xa Xb Xc ... − − − ...






iii ... − − − ... Xα Xβ Xγ ...
We can construct a third possible outcome, O3, such that the pair (O2, O3) is structurally
identical to (O1, O2) and so is (O3, O1). (This construction is somewhat complex, so uninterested
readers may wish to skip ahead to just after the comparison of O3 and O1.)
p1 p2 p3 p4 ... pi pii piii ... pa pb pc ... pα pβ pγ ...
O3 : − X2 X3 X4 ... − − − ... 0 Xβ Xγ ... 1 Xb Xc ...
To see why this construction is useful, first note that each of the sets B,C, and D are
structurally identical - for the same reasons as in the previous subsection, each contains an
infinite number of persons obtaining each possible level of value. That includes infinitely many
persons obtaining value 0, 1, and whatever else is possible. So, without loss of generality, we can
let pα be some person from the set D who obtains value 0 in O2, and let pa be some person from
C who obtains value 1 in O1. We can also let Xi = Xβ , Xii = Xγ , and so on, as well as X
′
i = Xb,
22One principle we might want to uphold is (Weak) Pareto Over Positions: if some outcomes Oa and Ob
contain the same positions in space and time, and the value arising at every position is at least as high in Oa as
in Ob, then Oa is at least as good as Ob. As Cain (1995), Askell (2018), and Wilkinson (2020) demonstrate, this
is incompatible with Pareto Over Persons. Using examples similar to the ones in those papers, it can be shown
that the principle is also incompatible with Weak Anonymity itself.
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X ′ii = Xc, and so on, since the labelling of persons within each set are entirely arbitrary. (Note
that Xa and Xα have both been skipped, as those were already specified as 1 and 0.)
Now compare O3 to each of O2 and O1, with a slight rearrangement of how we list the
persons. Both comparisons may look familiar.
A B′ C ′ D′︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
pα p2 p3 p4 ... pβ pγ pδ ... p1 pi pii ... pa pb pc ...
O2 : 0 X2 X3 X4 ... Xi Xii Xiii ... 1 Xb Xc ... − − − ...






iii ... − − − ... 0 Xβ Xγ ...
A B′′ C ′′ D′′︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
pa p2 p3 p4 ... pb pc pd ... pα pβ pγ ... p1 pi pii ...
O3 : 0 X2 X3 X4 ... Xi Xii Xiii ... 1 Xb Xc ... − − − ...






iii ... − − − ... 0 Xβ Xγ ...
Each of these pairs is analogous to the pair (O1, O2) above. By replacing the specific identities
in that pair of outcomes (in the same way in both outcomes), we can obtain the pair (O2, O3).
Likewise, we can obtain (O3, O1). And so weakly anonymous theories must say that O1 is at
least as good as O2 only if the same holds for those other pairs. And therein lies the problem.
There is no way that O2 can be better than O1, given that any plausible ‘at least as good as’
relation must be transitive (see Footnote 16). If O2 were better, we would have a cycle: O2
is better than O1, which is better than O3, which is better than O2. And similarly if O1 were
better. To avoid cycles, we must accept that either O1 and O2 are equally good or they are
incomparable.
But both verdicts are implausible. Recall that these are the outcomes of saving the child
from walking into traffic and of not saving them. We cannot say that it is better to save the
child. As above, that is implausible. And so weakly anonymous theories are implausible.
Believe it or not, the problem gets even worse than this for most weakly anonymous theories.
Most such theories endorse Pareto Over Persons, as defined above. And so they should, it
seems - it’s an overwhelmingly intuitive principle and, on the face of it, a compelling reason
for abandoning strongly anonymous theories for their weakly anonymous brethren. Indeed, it
is treated as axiomatic by each of the authors mentioned above. But if we accept Pareto Over
Persons, then the outcomes above cannot even be equally good; they must be incomparable. We
cannot even evaluate them!
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To see why, we can construct another pair of possible outcomes, O4 and O5. Again, this pair
may look familiar. (And again the construction is complex, so uninterested readers may wish to
skip the next paragraph.)
A B C ′′′ D′′′︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
p1 p2 p3 p4 ... pi′ pii′ piii′ ... pα pβ pγ ... pa pb pc ...
O4 : 0 X2 X3 X4 ... Xi Xii Xiii ... Xa Xb Xc ... − − − ...






iii ... − − − ... Xα Xβ Xγ ...
As before, this pair of outcomes are carefully constructed to be structurally identical to the
pair (O1, O2). But they are constructed to also ensure that each outcome is related to one of
the previous outcomes by Pareto Over Persons. This is achieved by first giving p1 the same pair
of values as in (O1, O2). Then every person in A,B,C, and D obtains the same value in O4
as in O2, and in O5 as in O1. On the same reasoning as above, we can assume without loss of
generality that Xa = Xα, Xb = Xβ , and so on for all of C and D. By similar reasoning, we
also know that B can be rearranged to the above: for every possible value between vmin and
vmax, there are infinitely many persons in B obtaining that value; but since every pair of values
Xi and X
′
i are independent, there will also be infinitely many persons obtaining each pair of
possible values across those two worlds; so, for any person pi who obtains Xi and X
′
i in O1 and
O2 respectively, there is some pi′ who obtains X
′
i and Xi respectively. And so we can rearrange
B as it has been immediately above, without changing the values obtained by any individual.
And so Pareto Over Persons compares O4 to O2 and O5 to O1. For O4 and O2, the same
persons exist in both outcomes; every person does just as well in O2 as O4 (everyone in A,B,C,
and D just equally well in both), and p1 does strictly better; so Pareto implies that O2 is strictly
better. Similarly, Pareto implies that O1 is strictly worse than O5.
From above, we know that weakly anonymous views allow only that O1 and O2 are either
equally good or incomparable. Suppose that they are equally good. Then, again by Weak
Anonymity, O4 and O5 are equally good. But this generates a cycle once again: O1 is equally
as good as O2, which is strictly better than O4, which is equally as good as O5, which is strictly
better than O1. This is impossible, since ‘at least as good as’ is a transitive relation. And so O1
and O2 cannot be equally good. They must instead be incomparable.
23
Again, this is implausible, and even more implausible than previous implication: the disjunc-
tion that the two outcomes are either equally good or incomparable. Surely it is better to save
23This argument is adapted from Askell (2018). Askell takes arguments like this as showing that outcomes are
often incomparable, rather than as showing that Weak Anonymity and Pareto Over Persons must be false.
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the child from the traffic accident rather than not save them. And surely, at the very least, our
moral theory can say something about how those outcomes compare. But weakly anonymous
theories which endorse Pareto Over Persons - all of those I have seen seriously proposed - cannot
compare them. So we should reject them, just as we did with strongly anonymous theories.
3.3 What’s left?
We’ve ruled out both strongly anonymous and weakly anonymous theories. What’s left? In
a sense, we still have available the entire space of possible theories of aggregation which are
not even weakly anonymous: those which provide comparisons of outcomes which are at least
occasionally dependent on the specific identities of the persons in the outcome pair, or dependent
on some qualitative properties of those persons beyond those mentioned above. But many of
those possible theories are clearly implausible.
Suppose we adopt a theory which allows dependency on the specific identities of the persons
in the outcome pair but not on any further qualitative properties. On such a theory, whether
some outcome Oa is better than Ob depends not just on whether it’s better for some people
(de dicto); it depends on whether it’s better for specific people. For instance, some Oa may be
better than Ob because it is better for Alexander, Bert, and however many other people. But,
in the qualitatively identical pair of outcomes Oa′ and Ob′ containing instead Alexandra, Beth,
and however many others, Oa′ is not better. And this is absurd.
So we are left with theories by which comparisons depend on some qualitative properties
of the persons within them (beyond just the value they obtain and whether they exist). And
persons have plenty of qualitative properties to choose from, e.g., their name, height, hair colour,
ethnicity, gender, and so on. But, of course, making our moral evaluations sensitive to changes
in any of these things is counterintuitive. Doing so seems to run counter to a basic motivation of
aggregative theories: that they remain impartial in an important sense. But making our evalua-
tions sensitive to changes in more than one of those properties is even more counterintuitive, and
an even clearer failure of impartiality. So I will assume that, at worst, a theory of aggregation
can have their comparisons depend on just one of these further qualitative properties.
But which such property is it plausible that moral evaluations may depend on? I can see
only one: position in time and(/or) space.
Why? Suppose you have an outcome containing infinitely many persons each obtaining
such and such values. And suppose we could change some qualitative property (and only that
property) of some number of those persons. But the value each person obtains and whether they
exist remain fixed. For which property is it least implausible that those changes would mean
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that those two outcomes are no longer equally good?
Suppose we changed the hair colour of some (or even all) of those people. It is clearly absurd
that that would produce an outcome not equally as good as the original. Likewise for a great
many properties, name, height, ethnicity, and gender included.
But suppose instead that we changed the positions of some (or even all) of those people in
space and time. Perhaps we spread them out to be astronomically far from one another. If
the original outcome has value 100 per unit of spacetime volume, the new outcome might have
just value 1 for the same volume. The universe is thereby packed far less densely with value.
It seems at least somewhat plausible that this makes the outcome worse, as a similar reduction
in value density in any universe of finite dimensions would result in a reduction in value. (The
same cannot be said of the changes in hair colour and so on, no matter how small the universe.)
And so I would suggest that the only remotely plausible theories of infinite aggregation
which are neither strongly nor weakly anonymous are those which are position-dependent : those
by which comparisons of outcomes at least sometimes depend on the positioning of persons in
space and time. This is not to say, at least for now, that these theories are anywhere near as
plausible as strongly or weakly anonymous theories; they are merely the most plausible of the
remaining alternatives and, of those alternatives, the most plausible by far. So the one category
of theory I will seriously consider here is position-dependent theories.
3.4 Position-dependent theories
Some, but not all, position-dependent theories have difficulty with chaos too.
Here is one relatively simple such theory, to illustrate this difficulty: the Overtaking criterion,
originally from von Weizsäcker (1965). By this theory, we still compare outcomes by some total
aggregates of value, but we don’t represent those totals as single finite sums. Instead, we sum
up the value in each outcome in the chronological order in which that value arises. For each
outcome, we take the subtotal of value up to each future time. The sequence of such subtotals
constitutes the ‘total’ of that outcome. And if one outcome has a higher subtotal than another
at time t, and for all future times t′, then we can say that that outcome is better. (The proposals
in Vallentyne and Kagan (1997: 19), Arntzenius (2014: 56), and Wilkinson (2020: 19) work in
a similar way, and will deliver the same verdicts below.) The theory can be stated precisely as
follows.
Overtaking : Let Oa, Ob be any possible outcomes, and let Va(t), Vb(t) be the corre-
sponding functions for the value that arises at each time t ∈ R.
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Then Oa is at least as good as Ob if and only if there exists t such that, for all t
′ > t,∑
0≤t≤t′
Va(t)− Vb(t) ≥ 0
How does Overtaking fare with outcomes which differ by chaotic effects? As you might guess
by now, it fares poorly.
Consider once again the decision between not saving and saving the child from walking into
traffic, with outcomes O1 and O2 respectively. As we’ve seen, those outcomes differ by chaotic
effects which last forever. All that distinguishes them in the agent’s eyes is that one contains
that child living out the rest of their days, and the other does not. They will also contain a lot of
the same events with the same values in both outcomes. And so too will they contain infinitely
many events which differ in value in a seemingly random manner. As in Section 2, we know that
the equation which appeared in the definition of Overtaking will be equivalent to this, at least
for large enough t′.24
∑
0≤t≤t′




Here, the values Zi are independent, identically distributed random variables which are sym-
metric about 0. And so this sum has the same key property as we saw in Section 2: it forms a
symmetric random walk. So, as we sum it up for increasing time t′ (which will have correspond-






As above, any such random walk will pass above and below 0 sporadically. It will never stop
24As in §2.4, these Zis may not correspond precisely to the difference in values at time ti. This allows them to
be independent, and so form a symmetric random walk. (See Footnote 12.)
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doing so, no matter how large N (and t′) grows (with probability arbitrarily close to 1).25 But we
need the walk to stay at or above 0 from some point onwards (or else at or below 0); otherwise,
Overtaking cannot say that either outcome is at least as good as the other. For outcomes which
differ this chaotically, Overtaking implies that they are incomparable.
And so we have one of the same implausible verdicts we reached above. As we did with the
previous views, we must reject Overtaking too.26
So chaos poses just as serious a problem for some position-dependent theories; some, but
thankfully not all. There is at least one proposal which does succeed in comparing outcomes as
badly behaved as O1 and O2, from Wilkinson (2020: 30). I won’t attempt to fully defend this
proposal - for my purposes here, it is enough to demonstrate that it succeeds where others fail.
Wilkinson’s (2020) proposal is somewhat complex, but goes roughly like this: like Overtaking,
we take subtotals of the value in each world, summing in the order that that value arises; like
Overtaking, we consider which is in the lead at each time, as given by the difference between
those subtotals; but, unlike Overtaking, we don’t just consider which outcome is in the lead - we
also consider how often they are in the lead, and by how far. We can obtain a useful measure
of how often and by how far an outcome is in the lead over another by taking the area under
the curve (shaded blue below) when we graph the difference between them over time. Taking
outcomes O1 and O2 whose difference over time follows a random walk as above, that area rises










25Crucially, the walk will be recurrent : for any value it passes through, it has probability arbitrarily close to 1
of returning to that point, indeed infinitely many times (Chung & Fuchs 1951).
26By similar reasoning, it is straightforward to show that the proposals from Vallentyne and Kagan (1997: 19),
Arntzenius (2014: 56), and Wilkinson (2020: 19) reach the same implausible verdict, as they are all close relatives
of Overtaking.
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More formally, we can apply the following rule. Note that the sum here matches the area
under the curve above, and the limit to infinity simply makes this the limit of the area as we
sum over infinite time.
Temporal Expansionism: Let Oa, Ob be any possible outcomes. For any time ti ∈ R,
let Va(ti), Vb(ti) be the functions for the value that arises at that time in Oa and Ob
respectively. And let T = {t1, t2, ..., ti, ...} be the ordered set of all times at which
Va(ti)− Vb(ti) 6= 0, ordered from earliest to latest.










And if the sum is bounded both above and below, then Oa and Ob are equally
good.2728
If that limit goes to +∞ then Oa has a greater subtotal than Ob at ‘most’ future times
(and/or, when it does, it holds a far greater lead). So we might think that Oa is better. And
if instead the limit stays finite, then both outcomes have a greater subtotal roughly as often as
each other. So we might think that they are equally as good.
Definitions aside, what really matters is how Temporal Expansionism fares with outcomes
which differ by chaotic effects. And this may come as a surprise after the failure of so many
other (categories of) theories, but it does just fine.
In the graph above, the area rises sharply from the beginning. As this graph suggests, this area
under the random walk does not recur endlessly like the walk itself does. In fact, it’s guaranteed
to not recur endlessly - it has probability arbitrarily close to 1 of diverging unconditionally to
either positive or negative infinity.29 And, if it diverges to +∞, then O2 is strictly better than
O1. Likewise, if it diverges to −∞, then O1 is better. So, for outcomes like these, Temporal
Expansionism is guaranteed to be able to compare them. In fact, it is guaranteed to say that
27The original rule from Wilkinson (2020) differs in the following ways. It sums value not simply over time
but over expanding regions of spacetime, increasing in spatial volume and temporal duration, which allows it to
compare outcomes with infinite value at a given time. And it does not assume a single absolute starting time;
instead, it offers a verdict only if the sum diverges or is bounded for every possible starting time (and place).
28Here is a further complication: modern physics tells us that measurements of time are relative to the velocity
of the measurer. This may spell disaster for a proposal that makes moral evaluations sensitive to temporal
positions. But it so happens that we can modify the rule slightly to overcome this problem (see Author n.d.(b)).
29To see this, take any finite upper and lower bounds. It can be shown that the probability that the area under
a symmetric random walk is within those bounds approaches 0 as r →∞ (Lipkin 2003).
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one is strictly better. Good news: at last, we have a theory which can discriminate between such
outcomes.
But there is also bad news. We know that this new sum (the area under the random walk)
will diverge to +∞ or −∞, but what is the probability that it goes to each? It is only 0.5. So,
even if you adopt Temporal Expansionism, you will be radically uncertain as to which outcome
will turn out better. We cannot confidently say that it is better to save the child from the traffic
accident. As before, this is worrying - we may want our theory of aggregation to let us say
confidently than one outcome is better than another.
But this result matches the situation we faced in the finite context (see §2.4); there too
it was just as likely that one outcome would turn out better as it was for the other. As in
that setting, we are left uncertain of which outcome is better but, since we know at least that
some outcome is, the possibility is left open that we can apply some principle of subjective,
instrumental betterness to give judgements under that uncertainty. (Readers satisfied with that
resolution can skip the next section; readers who want to see just how we might apply such a
subjective betterness principle, read on.)
4 Cluelessness in infinite worlds
Temporal Expansionism lets us say that some outcome is better, but it can never tell us with
confidence which it is - we seem to remain clueless of that fact. But is there some way that we
can say that a particular action will turn out better, perhaps along the same lines as the solution
sketched in §2.4? Yes. It is again easy to justify that it is subjectively better to save the child or,
equivalently, that it produces a better lottery than the alternative.
For my purposes, each lottery Li can be defined by an ordered pair (Oi, Pi), where Oi is a
set of possible outcomes and Pi is a probability measure on Oi representing the probability of
the lottery resulting in each possible outcome.30
How do we compare such lotteries? One fairly weak principle we can apply is Stochastic
Dominance. This principle is widely accepted in normative decision theory for finite payoffs, and
also appears as a axiom of the decision theory over infinite-world outcomes in Author (n.d.(a)).
Here, O<Oi denotes the subset of outcomes in Oi that are at least as good as some given outcome
O.
30This probability measure may be real-valued, or perhaps it allows infinitesimal probabilities. I want to remain
agnostic on this issue.
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Stochastic Dominance: Let La, Lb be any two lotteries. If Pa(O<Oa ) ≥ Pb(O
<O
b ) for
all O ∈ Oa ∪ Ob, then La is at least as good as Lb.
If, as well, Pa(O<Oa ) > Pb(O
<O
b ) for some O ∈ Oa ∪ Ob, then La is strictly better
than Lb.
To judge the case of saving the child or not, let Lsave be the lottery over outcomes produced
by saving the child, and L¬save that produced by not saving them.
It turns out that Stochastic Dominance, combined with Temporal Expansionism, judges Lsave
as better than L¬save. To see why, note first that Temporal Expansionism implies straightfor-
wardly that each outcome in Lsave - in which value 1 arises for the child then such and such other
values arise at all future times - is strictly better than the corresponding outcome in L¬save in
which the same such and such values arise at future times but value 0 arises for the child. And
those two outcomes have precisely the same probability in their respective lotteries (since all of
those other events are probabilistically independent of whether the child is saved). Grouping
those outcomes together, for any outcome O in O1, the probability that Lsave will turn out as
good as or better than O is the same as the probability that L¬save turns out as good or better
than O’s strictly worse counterpart. So, for every such O, there is a strictly greater probability
of getting an outcome as good as or better than O under Lsave than under L¬save.
31 And so
Stochastic Dominance says that Lsave is strictly better.
So we can say that it is subjectively better to save the child than to let them walk into
traffic, at least if we adopt Temporal Expansionism and even a very weak principle of subjective
betterness. We can not only say that some action turns out better, we can say confidently which
of them does, at least in terms of subjective betterness. And that is as much as we could hope
to be able to say, given that we cannot say any more than that in finite chaotic cases (Greaves
2016) or even in many much simpler cases (see Jackson 1991).
5 Conclusion
We are often uncertain about whether our actions will turn out for better or worse. But, in a
universe as chaotic as ours, that uncertainty runs deeper than we might have thought. Actions
which we might think have only trivial effects turn out to radically and permanently change the
course of the future.
That chaos poses an even greater problem given that our universe is most likely infinite. It
31This probability may be only infinitesimally larger, but larger it will nonetheless be.
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doesn’t only make us uncertain of whether an action will turn out better than another. On
almost all aggregative theories we have at our disposal, chaos implies that almost all actions
turn out no better than their alternatives, even when the verdict seems clear-cut. Contrary to
the seemingly clear-cut verdict, the outcomes are either equally good or entirely incomparable.
Most aggregative theories imply this, but not quite all. Some theories still say in those
cases that one outcome is better than another. But even the most plausible of those theories
of aggregation have a counterintuitive implication: that comparisons of outcomes can depend
on the positions in space and/or time of the people within them. In any given outcome, move
sufficiently many people around and you may make the outcome better or worse. That seems a
bizarre implication for a moral theory. But, to maintain a remotely plausible aggregative theory,
we must bite this bullet. Otherwise, we must accept that the world can never be made better
by almost any of our actions, which is even more implausible.
But you can also draw a different conclusion from my argument. After all, one philosopher’s
modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. So too, one philosopher’s bullet to bite is another’s
ammunition. You might think it more plausible that all aggregative theories are false than that
moral evaluation depends on the positioning of value in spacetime. If so, you may take the
argument above as showing that we should reject aggregation entirely.32
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